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The Limits of State Activity in the
Interstate Water Market
Ann Berkley Rodgers*
In an effort to ensure future water supplies, many western
states are becoming participants in the market for water. As
market participants,states gain a proprietaryinterest in their
water resources which more effectively secures their right to the
water than mere regulationor claims of ownership under the public
trust doctrine.As the author points out, however, the Constitution imposes numerous limitations on state water market activity. The privileges and immunities clause, the commerce clause,
the property clause, as well as the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, all influence the manner in which states
may behave. Most significantly, the authorexplains, these clauses
prevent states from using theirpower as water market participants
as a disguise for economic protectionism.
A not so quiet revolution is taking place in states' attitudes toward
water resources. The primary impetus for change is the increasing uncertainty over the ability of state governments to ensure the availability of
water in the future for a wide variety of societal needs. This uncertainty
is the result of a combination of factors, but the most important are growing water scarcity and the creation of an interstate water market. Initially, water scarcity led states to engage in water resources planning and
management; it was believed that future needs could be met by carefully
regulating demand based upon a predetermined available supply.' The
*Assistant Research Professor, Natural Resources Center, University of New Mexico
School of Law; B.A., University of New Mexico, 1980; J.D., University of New Mexico School
of Law, 1983.
1. For New Mexico, depletion of an artesian aquifer led to early groundwater regulation. See Yeo v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 286 P. 970 (1929). In Arizona, groundwater depletion
was the impetus for the promulgation of a comprehensive groundwater management code.
See FINAL

REPORT OF ARIZONA GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT STUDY COMMISSION I-2

(June

1980).
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available supply was defined by law. As between states it was assumed
that compacts or, perhaps, principles of equitable apportionment defined
surface water supplies. It was believed that states had exclusive control
over groundwater. With the creation of an interstate market, though, the
law no longer assures certainty of supply. The available supply may be
defined more by economic trends within a region than by notions of legal
entitlement. In response to this new uncertainty, some states have decided
to become active participants in the water market, thereby acquiring sufficient supplies to meet the needs of future generations.
This article examines the possible constitutional limitations on state
participation in the water market to determine if it is an appropriate tool
for water resources management. Before focusing on the possible constitutional limits of market participation, it will be useful to consider the extent of state authority to regulate the use of water resources, thereby
highlighting why some states have decided that regulation, alone, is not
sufficient to meet future water needs.
THE NEED FOR STATE PROPRIETARY INTERESTS IN WATER RESOURCES

Before 1982, officials in most states believed they had an absolute right
to some portion of the water flowing in interstate streams through their
state. Groundwater was assumed to be the subject to exclusive state control for two reasons: (1)its use was seen as a matter of local concern, just
as land use is still primarily a local matter, and (2) in many western states
groundwater was thought to be owned by the state under the public trust
doctrine. 2 Even when states compacted to equitably apportion surface
water rights, there was little or no mention of groundwater because it was
not viewed as a shared resource. By projecting future instate demand and
relating that to the instate supply of surface and groundwater, states were
able to manage water resources and be reasonably certain of their water
future.
In 1982, however, litigation to equitably apportion the Vermejo River
between Colorado and New Mexico made state rights to surface waters
uncertain in at least two respects. In Colorado v. New Mexico (I),3 the
Court rejected the notion that a state had some inchoate right to use surface waters flowing through its territory because it was inconsistent with
the Court's "emphasis on flexibility in equitable apportionment."4 The
Court also held that, in an equitable apportionment, harms and benefits
to the competing states should be weighed. This suggests that existing
uses in one state might not be certain if another state could make more
efficient use of the water in a proposed future diversion.5 Although the
potential impact of this efficiency test was somewhat modified in Colorado
2. In many states, rights to groundwater attach to the ownership of land. See infra

note 30 and accompanying text. Land use regulation has been identified with a states' police
power. See infra text accompanying notes 12-13. Many constitutions of western states have
provisions specifying that water is public property. See infra text accompanying notes 9-13.
3. 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
4. 1& at 181 n.8 (citations omitted).
5. Id at 190.
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v. New Mexico (II),6 so as to require a state to present clear and convincing evidence of inefficiency before existing uses would be reduced to allow
for other present or future uses, the Court made it clear that state authority over surface water is now dependent on use, not territory.7 To provide
some protection for existing uses, this holding establishes that water will
be apportioned for the future only where there are concrete plans for future
use. In New Mexico (II), for example, the Court held that Colorado's proposed uses were too vague:
[W]e find ourselves without adequate evidence to approve Colorado's proposed diversion. Colorado has not committed itself to
any long-term use for which the future benefits can be studied and
predicted. Nor has Colorado specified how long the interim agricultural use might or might not last. All Colorado has established
is that a steel corporation wants to take water for some unidentified use in the future.8
In 1982, the Supreme Court also fundamentally altered the authority
of states over groundwater resources within their boundaries. In Sporhase
v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,9 the Court held that groundwater rights were
commodities in interstate commerce.' 0 Nebraska had argued that its exportation permit process was not subject to commerce clause scrutiny
because groundwater was owned not by individual appropriators but by
the state as trustee for the public by virtue of the public trust doctrine.I'
The Supreme Court rejected the view that the public trust doctrine created
a proprietary interest for the state in its water supplies, concluding that
Nebraska's asserted "state ownership" was merely a legal fiction, a shorthand description of the importance of the resource to the welfare of the
state's citizens.' 2 While the Court rejected the notion that the public trust
interest in water constitutes ownership, it recognized that a state has a
heightened police power, or regulatory interest, in water resources by virtue of the doctrine.
In deference to this heightened regulatory interest, the Court allowed
that a state could prefer instate uses to a limited extent. An export permit could be denied if it was found to work against the conservation of
groundwater or proved to be detrimental to the public welfare even though
these were not requirements for intrastate transfers." The only requirement of the statute that offended the commerce clause was the reciprocito a state
ty provision which declared that water could not be exported
4
that did not allow its water to be used in Nebraska.
6. 104 S.Ct. 2433 (1984).

7. Id. at 2438. See generally Comment, Is There a Future for Proposed Water Uses
in Equitable Apportionment Suits, 25 NAT. RES. J. 791 (1985).
8. 104 S.Ct. at 2441.
9. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
10. Id. at 954.
11. Id. at 951.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 955.
14. Id. at 957-58.
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Admittedly there was little in the decision to shock constitutional
specialists. Recent rulings involving other natural resources had debunked
the notion that the public trust doctrine created state-held property rights,
especially where individuals could acquire property rights to the resource, 5
and few reciprocity statutes have been upheld when resource conservation was the asserted legislative purpose.6 After Sporhase,however, states
could no longer claim an exclusive right to groundwater within their boundaries and the availability of water supply became a function of the phrase
"public welfare," a concept incapable of precise definition. 7
The Supreme Court did not have to grapple with the much harder
issues involved in public welfare preferences. Those issues were addressed
by the Federal District Court in City of El Paso v. Reynolds,' 8 in which
El Paso applied for permits to appropriate water in southern New Mexico for export to Texas. The city challenged the constitutionality of the
New Mexico export statute on its face because it only allowed water to
be exported if it was not otherwise "detrimental to the public welfare of
the state."' 9 El Paso argued that the statute was intrinsically
discriminatory because it allowed the decision-maker to disregard the
public welfare of noncitizens. 0 The court rejected this argument and held
the statute to be facially constitutional.' It cautioned, however, that the
public welfare preference could not be used to protect economic interests:
[W]hen the State exercises a preference for its citizens under the
rubric of protecting their public welfare and economic interests
are implicated, the resulting burden on interstate commerce must
be weighed against the putative noneconomic local benefits....
If the public welfare criterion is used to effectuate simple economic
protectionism, a per se rule of invalidity will be applied.2"
El Paso's challenge to the statute was based upon the notion that the
promotion of local economic interests cannot be separated from a generalized promotion of the public welfare. Yet, many definitions of public welfare include the promotion of local economies.2 3 In the alternative, the city
tried to limit any noneconomic public welfare preference to basic human
15. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431
U.S. 265 (1977); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). As with complete embargoes, the
result of such statutes is that the burdens of resource conservation are borne by out-of-state
interests, those least able to take part in the legislative process.
16. A reciprocity provision does not promote conservation since it does not limit instate uses. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 958; Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
17. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (upholding the use of eminent domain
for urban renewal projects).
18. 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
19. Id. at 699.
20. I& at 700.
21. Id. at 702.
22. Id. at 700-01 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
23. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31. See also Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff,
104 S.Ct. 2321 (1984).
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survival, or purely health and a safety needs. These narrow constructions
were also rejected:
"Public welfare" is a broad term including health and safety,
recreational, aesthetic, environmental and economic interests. Admittedly, except to the extent that it refers to bare human survival, every aspect of the public welfare has economic overtones.
This does not mean that New Mexico may constitutionally exercise a limited preference for its citizens only when their survival
did not equate "public
is at stake. The Supreme Court in Sporhase
2' 4
welfare" with "human survival.
For New Mexico, defining available water supplies is increasingly difficult due to the amorphous nature of the "public welfare." "An attempt
to define its reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless, for each case must
turn on its own facts."5 When a court must also decide whether the purpose of a public use is primarily for economic growth, the scope of any
preference becomes exceedingly grey. For example, a statute that grants
a preference for agricultural use over other commercial uses in a state that
has an agricultural economy might be seen, on one hand, as mere economic
protectionism or, on the other hand, as a legitimate collective preference
for the cultural and aesthetic values associated with a pastoral lifestyle.
Line drawing would also be difficult if a preference for some recreational
uses is challenged; a lake can serve recreational purposes and as an inducement to attract tourism and associated economic development to an
area.
When both the Colorado v. New Mexico cases and the progeny of
Sporhase v. Nebraska are taken together, it seems that state control of
water resources will be inextricably entwined with notions of economic
efficiency. The danger is that this will be at the expense of competing
noneconomic values. As noted by Professor Trelease, "[tihe possibility
that the regulation may be economically inefficient ordinarily gives rise
to no substantial constitutional objection. The Constitution did not enact
Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations.,2 6 Professor Sax points out that "[tlo
characterize [the state's] behavior as inappropriate or illegitimate or to
hold it to some specified test of efficiency is simply to deny the possibility of a distinctive collective preference.' '27
One response to the notion that interstate market preferences may
dictate regional water futures in a manner inconsistent with noneconomic
values has been the issuance by states of joint policy statements asserting regional collective preferences. States surrounding the Great Lakes,
along with their Canadian counterparts, have created the Great Lakes
24. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 700 (D.N.M. 1984).
25. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
26. Trelease, State Water and State Lines: Commerce in Water Resources, 56 U. COLO.
L. REV. 347 (1985) (citing to Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Cour the Commerce
Clause and State Control of NaturalResources, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 51, 73).
27. Sax, The Legitimacy of Collective Values: The Case of the PublicLands, 56 U. COLO.
L. REV. 537 (1985).
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Charter, vowing to prevent large-scale diversions to maintain the integrity of the Lakes. 2 The region is certainly not short of water; instead, the
people of the region have unequivocally stated their desire to preserve
the quality of life by protecting the lakes. It must be realized that, no
matter how grand, the charter does not have the force of law 29 and the
28. The Great Lakes Charter provides the following "Principals for Management of
Great Lakes Water Resources":
In order to achieve the purposes of this Charter, the Governors and Premiers
of the Great Lakes States and Provinces agree to the following principles.
Principle I:
Integrity of the Great Lakes Basin
The planning and management of the water resources of the Great Lakes
Basin should recognize and be founded upon the integrity of the natural
resources and ecosystem of the Great Lakes Basin. The water resources of the
Basin transcend political boundaries within the Basin, and should be recognized
and treated as a singly hydrologic system. In managing Great Lakes Basin
waters, the natural resources and ecosystem of the Basin should be considered
as a unified whole.
Principle II:
Cooperation Among Jurisdictions
The signatory States and Provinces recognize and commit to a spirit of
cooperation among local, state, and provincial agencies, the federal governments of Canada and the United States, and the International Joint Commission in the study, monitoring, planning, and conservation of the water resources
of the Great Lake Basin.
Principle III:
Protection of the Water Resources of the Great Lakes
The signatory States and Provinces agree that new or increased diversions
and consumptive uses of Great Lakes Basin water resources are of serious concern. In recognition of their shared responsibility to conserve and protect the
water resources of the Great Lake Basin for the use, benefit, and enjoyment
of all their citizens, the States and Provinces agree to seek (where necessary)
and to implement legislation establishing programs to manage and regulate
the diversion and consumptive use of Basin water resources. It is the intent
of the signatory States and Provinces that diversions of Basin water resources
will not be allowed if individually or cumulatively they would have any significant adverse impacts on lake levels, in-basin uses, and the Great Lake Ecoystem.
Principle IV:
Prior Notice and Consultation
It is the intent of the signatory States and Provinces that no Great Lakes
State or Province will approve or pemit any major new or increased diversion
or consumptive use of the water resources of the Great Lake Basin without
notifying and consulting with and seeking the consent and concurrence of all
affected Great Lakes States and Provinces.
Principle V:
Cooperative Programs and Practices
The Governors and Premiers of the Great Lakes States and Provinces commit to pursue the development and maintenance of a common base of data and
information regarding the use and management of Basin water resources, to
the establishment of systematic arrangements for the exchange of water data
and information, to the creation of a Water Resources Management Committee, to the development of a Great Lakes Basin Water Resources Management
Program, and to additional and concerted and coordinated research efforts to
provide improved information for future water planning and management
decisions.
GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS TASK FORCE ON WATER DIVERSIONS AND GREAT LAKES INSTITUTIONS, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 41 (Jan. 1985).

29. The charter does not constitute binding law for a variety of reasons. First, although
the governors and premiers of the states and provinces agreed to the Charter, it was not
enacted by any legislative body. Furthermore, the Charter is an agreement between individual
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charter, alone, does not prevent any diversion. It merely states a regional
desire to maintain the character of the lakes. In contrast state-held property interests are entitled to protection under law. Hence, states are entering the water market to create such property interests thereby providing
certainty, minimal prerequisites of rational planning, some notion of the
future water supply and to ensure the legitimacy of any planned use.
For some states, the ownership of land is sufficient to create a property interest in water resources by virtue of state law.30 However, in states
that apply the doctrine of prior appropriation or the rule of capture, ownership of land is not sufficient to create a proprietary interest in water
resources. To create proprietary rights in water, many states are appropriating water and investing state monies to develop aquatic resources,
just as private individuals do. Montana has asserted proprietary interests
in water by legislative mandate. In addition to acquiring proprietary instates and a foreign nation. Under the compacts clause of the United States Constitution,
Congress would have to consent to the Charter before it could have the force of law. The
intent of the Charter could be given the force of law if states adopted legislation to effectuate the intent of the Charter.
30. Following is a discussion of states in which proprietary interests in groundwater
are automatically derived from ownership of overlying lands:
Arizona
The rule of reasonable use still applies to groundwater located outside critical areas
in Arizona. Therefore, where the state is the owner of land, it has the right to all the groundwater that it can put to reasonable use on overlying lands it owns. See generally 5 WATER
AND WATER RIGHTS, §§ 441-46 (R. Clark ed. 1972)
California
The correlative rights doctrine governs groundwater use in this state. This rule gives
the overlying landowner the right to a reasonable share of the water in the groundwater
basin for use on their overlying lands. This right exists whether or not the overlying landowner has used water in the past. Any surplus can be transferred to other users; therefore,
as with Arizona, California has proprietary interests in groundwater based on land ownership. In contrast to groundwater, use of surface waters in California is governed by both
riparian and prior appropriation principles. Id
Colorado
Colorado amended its groundwater laws this past year to allow the state to claim proprietary interests in groundwater underlying state-owned lands. Colorado Rejects Use It
or Lose It, U.S. WATER NEWS, July 1985, at 6. The state also imposed an export fee on interstate transfers of water. The Attorney General of Colorado has already issued an opinion
finding this fee to be unconstitutional:
The imposition of a fee on exports, on the other hand, is not narrowly
tailored to these equitable apportionment and conservation purposes and is
certainly not the least discriminatory means to achieve them. See Hughes v.
California, 441 U.S. 337. When section 37-81-104 is superimposed on the other
limitations contained in sections 37-81-101(3) and 37-81-103, it does not appear that the imposition of an export fee adds anything to those provisions
that "significantly advances the state's legitimate conservation and preservation interest .... Sporhase v. Nebraska,458 U.S. 958. The statute also suffers from the same defect that was condemned in Philadelphiav. New Jersey,
437 U.S. at 628-it imposes the full burden of conserving the scarce natural
resource on out-of-state interests. Finally, it is unclear, in light of Commonwealth Edison Company v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, and the Complete Auto
Transit test applied therein, that a fee that on its face discriminates against
interstate commerce, no matter what its justification, can withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Application of House Bill 1070 § 6 (May 23, 1985), ON/R8504066/AON Op. Att'y Gen. 11
(1985).
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terests, some states, especially Montana," Texas3 2 and perhaps Colorado,"3
are preparing to participate in the water market.
MARKET REGULATION VERSUS MARKET PARTICIPATION

A state is a participant, rather than a regulator, in the interstate
market of goods or resources if it expends its revenues to acquire goods

and services in the market or to produce goods and services that are subsequently sold in the market.3 4 When state activity has these characteristics,

the state is free to make the same market choices as any other market
participant. Many state activities might fall into these categories. A fundamental limitation on state market participation is that it cannot be used
as a subterfuge to regulate the activities of other markets or unrelated
transactions in the same market." If a state's real goal is to regulate a
secondary market and favor its own citizens over citizens of other states,
this not true market participation.

Although state legislation often recites the explicit purpose it seeks

to serve, 36 courts are not obliged to accept that stated purpose. The court

must "determine for itself the practical impact of the law. ' 37 Thus, a
statute that impermissibly regulates the market might be invalid even

though it expressly states that it is not designed to regulate the market.
The South-Central Timber v. Wunnicke,3 8 decision exemplifies this principle. Alaska adopted a primary manufacture requirement for the sale of

timber on state-owned lands. Timber could only be purchased by lumber
39

companies only if the initial processing would be done in the state.
Although the state was acting in a proprietary capacity when selling the
31. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-141 (1985). Montana has adopted a state water-leasing
program rather than merely making arrangements to sell water.
32. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 15.323(a) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1986). The Texas Department of Water Resources can sell unappropriated public water of the state and other water
acquired by the state.
33. See supra note 30.
34. The market participant exception to dormant commerce clause scrutiny was described by the Court in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) and Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980). Absent some exercise of the federal commerce power,
state market activity is not subject to restraint because the activity does not constitue state
regulation of interstate commerce.
35. South-Central Timber v. Wunnicke, 104 S.Ct. 2237 (1984). Essentially, a state may
not use its sovereign authority to control downstream or secondary markets, which would
be similar to an illegal restraint on trade and thus viewed as a regulatory subterfuge. The
line between valid market participation and regulatory subterfuge is not easy to see. Some
commentators have argued that distinctions between state proprietary actions and regulatory
actions are artificial and serve no purpose. See Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate
Equality,48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (1981). For a different approach, see Easterbrook, Antitrust
and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. LAW & EcoN. 23 (1983). In the past, courts have
used the proprietary/regulatory distinction in other contexts, particularly inter-governmental
tax immunity. For a brief discussion of why the distinction is no longer used in tax immunity cases, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
36. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12A-2 (Repl. Pamp. 1983), which sets out the
legislative purposes of the Mine Dewatering Act.
37. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
38. 104 S.Ct. 2237 (1984).
39. 11 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE § 76.130 (1974) (repealed 1982).
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timber, the Supreme Court struck down the initial processing requirement
because the effect was indirect regulation of a secondary market-timber
processing-in a manner that violated the commerce clause. Rather than
affecting state market activity, the statute served only to limit the activities of the state's trading partners in a completely different market. 0
In the case of Cory v. Western Oil & Gas Association," the court considered a system introduced by the State of California for calculating fees
for the use of state-owned lands that increased state land revenues
substantially. A lessee challenged the new fee schedule as an undue burden
on commerce.4 1 California insisted that it was merely acting as a market
participant, leasing its property on the "open market."43 The lands in question were submerged tidelands, the bulk of which were owned by the state.
The lessee had been leasing the property for a number of years and had
made substantial improvements." Therefore, the lessee was not in the
same position as one who could obtain the same "good" from another seller
in the market. From the standpoint of the lessee the state was the only
seller, using its inordinate bargaining power in a coercive manner.
The court of appeals rejected California's argument that it was a
market participant, preferring to describe promulgation of a fee schedule
as a regulatory activity and therefore the fee as a tax.45 As a tax the new
fee schedule was unduly burdensome because it was not reasonably related
to services provided by the state.4 6 One commentator has said, "[wihen
a proposed government business mirrors so closely what is now being done
without proprietary coloring, a court could be expected to examine the
enterprise very closely to determine its justification. ' ' 41 Thus, the first
overall federal limitation on state market participation is that it must,
in fact, be real market participation, not disguised regulation.
LIMITATIONs DERIVED FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution applies to any state
action regardless of whether the state is acting as a market participant
40. See supra note 34.

41. 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1984), affd 105 S.Ct. 2349 (1985) (no opinion, equally divided
court). Cf Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), in which an oil company
alleged that a tribal tax was not a regulatory act, but merely an invalid increase in royalities
to be paid to the tribe in a proprietary capacity. The Supreme Court found that the power
to tax was a valid tribal government activity, distinct from proprietary activities.
42. Cory, 726 F.2d at 1341.
43. Id at 1342.
44. Id. at 1341.
45. Id at 1345.
46. Id See Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). In that case, the
Supreme Court adopted a four-part test to determine the validity of state taxes on goods
in interstate commerce. The state must show a nexus with the taxing state, proper apportionment between states, non-discriminatory application, and that the tax is fairly related
to services provided by the taxing state. The California fee schedule did not meet this last
requirement and, therefore, constituted impermissible taxation. Cory, 726 F.2d at 1345.
47. Note, New Mexico Continues to Study Water Embargo Measures: A Reply to the
TEXAS TECH L. REV. 939, 948 (1985).

State Water Law Study Committee, 16
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or as a regulator. 8 The discussion is divided into three areas. The first
examines possible market participation limitations imposed by the due
process clause. It is followed by an examination of the privileges and immunities limitations and the equal protection limitations on market
participation.
Due Process
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prevents the
states from taking private property for a public purpose without compensation. Although one cannot own a body of water, the right to use water
is a transferable property right in many states. When a state exerts its
sovereign authority it may act by eminent domain. While this results in
the state obtaining a proprietary interest, the interest is created by
sovereign coercion rather than by proprietary action. The property is taken
and the owner is compensated, but, 9unless otherwise unconstitutional, the
owner cannot prevent the taking.4
State market participation anticipates no condemnation of private
water rights. Where the state is a market participant, water rights are
acquired under the same procedures applicable to individuals. In prior appropriation states this would be by appropriation or by purchase. Consent of the parties is the vital element; there is no sovereign coercion as
with an exercise of powers of eminent domain.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause
Individual rights under the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment are those held by individuals as citizens of the
United States. Early cases interpreting the fourteenth amendment construed this clause quite narrowly. 0 It has not been a prolific source of
law for the modern court and will not be discussed in great detail. Should
48. U.S.

CONST.

amend. XIV provides:

No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
49. A taking would be otherwise unconstitutional if not taken for a public use. The public
use requirement has been interpreted in a liberal manner, to be coterminous with the scope
of the state's police power. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S.Ct. 2321 (1984). InMidkiff
the Supreme Court upheld Hawaii's Land Reform Act, which created a condemnation scheme
whereby title to real property is taken from lessors and transferred to their lessees. Lessors
challenged the act, asserting that the condemnation was not for a public use since the property is redistributed to private persons, not the public. The Court disagreed, finding that
it is only the taking's purpose, not is mechanics, that is subject to judicial scrutiny; regulating
oligopoly and associated evils is a legitimate public purpose. See generally Comment, Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff-A New Slant on Social Legislation: Taking from the Rich
to Give to the Well-To-Do, 25 NAT. RES. J. 773 (1985).
50. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). No definitive enumeration of rights
protected by the clause was given by the Court in this case, but it was suggested that it
protected those "which owe their existence to the Federal Government, its national characters,
its Constitution, or its laws." Id. at 79. As examples, the Court referred to the right of access to the seat of government and to the seaports, subtreasuries, land officers, and courts
of justice in the several states and rights secured by treaty.
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a state action effectively deny someone a resident of another state the
water necessary for survival, absent an equally compelling interest such
as providing for the survival of its own residents, surely this would be
a violation of a fundamental right of national citizenship. The action would
be unconstitutional no matter what specific constitutional provision served
as a basis for the challenge.51
Of greater importance to state participation in water markets are the
individual rights protected by the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." While the
fourteenth amendment protects the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship, article IV clause, section 2 protects the privileges and immunities of state citizenship and ensures that a state cannot deny to
citizens of other states the fundamental rights it recognizes in its own
citizens inside its borders. Individual rights under this clause are most
analogous to prohibitions on state regulation derived from the commerce
clause. The privileges and immunities52 clause protects the right of people
to move freely across state borders, just as the commerce clause protects the flow of goods in the interstate market. Privileges and immunities
conditions placed on receiving
issues arise primarily in cases involving
53
services.
and
goods
state-distributed
The clause "was designed to ensure to a citizen of state A who ventures into state B the same privileges which the citizens of state B enjoy. "4 The essence of the clause is that it guarantees individual mobility,
happiness. It
allowing everyone the liberty to engage in the pursuit of
55 pursue a comemployment,
protects the rights of non-residents to57seek
mercial livelihood, 56 establish a home, own and dispose of privately held
property, 8 or procure needed services" in the state of their choice. The
clause does not, however, require a state to provide benefits it bestows
within the state on those located elsewhere.
51. The right of each individual to those resources necessary for survival transcends
our constitutional document. According to Locke, it is the basis for the creation of private
property. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. V. (1690) More contemporary
treatment can be found in cases interpreting the right to travel because this right ensures
the mobility of individuals to gain access to those necessary resources. See Zobel v. Williams,
457 U.S. 55 (1982) (equal protection clause); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371
(1978) (privileges and immunities clause in art. 4, § 2). Conversely, in Sporhase v. Nebraska,
458 U.S. 941 (1982), the Court made it clear that the commerce clause, which ensures the
free flow of commerce, would not prevent a state from denying out-of-state uses of water
if it was needed to ensure the public welfare of its residents. As noted above, public welfare
is much more than bare human survival.
52. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160 (1941). See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-32 (1978) ("[This clause] builds
a bridge between federalism and personal rights ...").
53. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n,
436 U.S. 371 (1978).
54. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) (emphasis added).
55. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
56. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
57. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
58. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
59. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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A state clearly may undertake to enhance the advantages of industry, economy and resources that make it a desireable place to
live. In addition, a state may make residence within its boundaries
more attractive by offering benefits to its citizens in the form of
public services, lower taxes or direct distribution of its munificence.6
Given that interstate commerce in water turns on where water is to
be used and not on where the user resides, it is unlikely that a refusal
to distribute water outside a state would invoke prohibitions based on
the privileges and immunities clause. In all states, a citizen from state
B is free to come to state A and use the water in state A, consistent with
the laws of state A. Only if place-of-use requirements were held to be
analogous to residency requirements would the privileges and immunities
clause of the Constitution be of importance. The following review of recent cases involving state hiring practices suggests that, absent some
showing that a state is using its market position in a coercive, monopolistic
manner to place the cost of in-state benefits on outsiders, there would
likewise be no violation of the privileges and immunities clause because
a state is participating in an interstate market.
When a privileges and immunities issue is raised, the Court employs
a two-part analysis to determine the validity of the challenged state activity. First, the party challenging the activity must show that it has the
effect of denying a fundamental privilege. If no privilege is found the clause
is of no force.61 "Only with respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities'
bearing upon the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens,
resident and nonresident, equally."6 The second inquiry is whether state
residency is a legitimate basis for discrimination. "The inquiry in each
case must be concerned with whether [substantial] reasons do exist and
whether the degree of discrimination bears a close relationship to them." 63
Essentially, it would have to be shown that those uses that were refused
constituted "a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed." 64
60. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1982).
61. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
62. Id at 383.
63. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948).
64. Id at 398. Due to the close connection between this clause and the commerce clause,
it was not clear until recently that this clause could limit a state if it were merely participating
in a market. In White v. Massachusetts,103 S.Ct. 1042 (1983), an executive order issued
by the Mayor of Boston requiring that city-funded construction projects be performed
by
a work force, half of which had to be Boston residents, was challenged as an undue
burden
on commerce. The Court found that city spending on construction projects was merely
state
participation in a labor market and therefore the residency requirement was not violative
of the commerce clause. The Court did not address whether state market participation
was
subject to limitations imposed by the privileges and immunities clause. It did suggest,
however, that where market participation was used by the state to affect parties unrelated
to the market transaction, residency requirements would be invalid. Hicklin v.Orbeck,
437
U.S. 518 (1978), the classic privileges and immunities clause case, was cited to support
this
proposition.
In Hicklin we considered an Alaska statute which required employment in all
work connected with oil and gas leases to which the State was a party to be
offered first to 'qualified' Alaska residents in preference to nonresidents. The
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The Supreme Court discussed the effect of the privileges and immunities clause on state market participant activity in6 5United Building
& Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, in which labor
organizations challenged state agency approval of a municipal ordinance
that was very similar to Boston's executive order affirmed in White v.
Massachusetts.6 6 The Court, refusing to "transfer mechanistically" to the
privileges and immunities clause an analysis fashioned to fit the commerce
clause, found that characterizing state activity as market participation
did not obviate concerns stemming from the privileges and immunities
clause:
The Privileges and Immunities Clause, on the other hand, imposes
a direct restraint on state action in the interest of interstate harmony. It is discrimination against out-of-state residents on matters of fundamental concern which triggers the Clause, not regulation affecting interstate commerce. Thus, the fact that Camden
is merely setting conditions on its expenditures for goods and services in the marketplace does not preclude the possibility that
67
those conditions violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
This does not mean, however, that any resident preference tied to state
market activity would violate the privileges and immunities clause. As
mentioned above, it must constitute a denial of a fundamental privilege.
Cases involving resident preferences in hiring involve one of the most fundamental privileges in a free society: the pursuit of a common calling to
seek employment. It is unlikely, however, that refusal to sell a commodity that is available from others in the market would deny a fundamental
privilege.
In Camden, the only issue before the Court was whether the state
market activity was subject to limitations imposed by the privileges and
immunities clause. The case was then remanded for further fact finding
State sought to justify the 'Alaska Hire' law on the ground that the underlying oil and gas were owned by the State itself. Analyzing the case under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, we held that mere ownership of a natural resource did not in all circumstances render a state regulation such as the 'Alaska Hire' law immune from attack under that Clause.
White, 103 S.Ct. at 1046.
The Court summarized its view in Hicklin, in which it stated:
In sum, the Act is an attempt to force virtually all businesses that benefit in
some way from the economic ripple effect of Alaska's decision to develop its
oil and gas resources to bias their employment practices in favor of the State's
residents.
Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 531. Boston's executive order considered in White, by comparison, only
covered "a discrete, identifiable class of economic activity in which the city is a major participant." White, 103 S.Ct. at 1046 n.7.
65. 104 S.Ct. 1020 (1984).
66. 103 S.Ct. 1042 (1983). In Camden, pursuant to a state-wide affirmative action program, the Camden City Council adopted an ordinance setting minority hiring goals on all
public works contracts. The ordinance also created a hiring preference for Camden residents
by establishing a goal that at least forty percent of the employees of contractors and subcontractors be Camden residents. The ordinance defined "resident" as "any person who resides
in the City of Camden." Developers, contractors and subcontractors were to make "every
good faith effort" to comply with the goal. Camden, 104 S.Ct. at 1023-25.
67. Camden, 104 S.Ct. at 1028-29 (citations omitted).
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as to whether municipal residency was a legitimate basis for discrimination.68 The Court made it clear that state ownership of a marketable good

and the fact that a state is spending its own revenues are factors to be
considered in evaluating whether a substantial reason exists to support
discrimination against nonresidents. The Court suggested, however, that
it would be impermissible for a state to indirectly regulate the private
market transactions of any parties other than the state's trading part69
ners.
Since the decision in Hicklin v. Orbeck,70it has been clear that any
resident preference must be narrowly tailored to address the perceived
evil posed by nonresidents. The statute at issue in that case required the
entire oil and gas industry in the state to prefer Alaska residents over
nonresidents merely because the state owned the natural resources to be
developed.7 It was overinclusive because it not only restricted the hiring
practices of its trading partners, but many others as well.
A review of cases challenging resident employment preference statutes
in which a state is acting in a proprietary capacity suggests that a state
may not use its bargaining power to indirectly regulate industry hiring
practices. A recent decision of the Alaska Supreme Court invalidated a
resident preference for employment on public construction projects.2 The
court found that "public works account for the majority of commercial
construction in the state" and "the exclusion mandated by Alaska's
statute-ninety to one hundred percent resident workers required-is far
more absolute than that in the Camden ordinance."" The economy of the
state was found to be "dynamic and growing" in constrast to that of
Camden.7 ' Thus, the Alaska statute smacked of pure economic protectionism, with the state using its large market share to indirectly regulate
hiring practices of an industry.
The Wyoming Supreme Court reached the opposite result when it ruled
on the validity of that state's resident hiring preference for publicly funded
construction projects. 75 The court relied on language in Camden that suggested that state funding was a crucial factor in determining the validity
of a resident preference. It is noteworthy that the Wyoming statute does
not set out any resident quota"6 and there was no indication that public
works accounted for the majority of all construction activity in the state.
The emerging restriction on state market activity by the privileges
and immunities clause is that when a fundamental right is implicated a
state cannot use its massive market power to indirectly regulate or restrict
68. Id at 1030.
69. Id
70. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
71. See supra note 64.
72. Robinson v. Francis, No. 5-493, slip op. (Alaska Jan. 17, 1986).
73. Id
74. Id
75. State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1985). See Note, Wyoming Upholds a Resident Laborer Preference Statute, 21 LAND & WATER L. REV. 219 (1985).
76. Wyoming Preference Act, WYo. STAT. §§ 16-6-101 to -206 (1977).
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the practices of those who are not its trading partners, so as to arbitrarily hoard all secondary benefits for its citizens. This, of course, is also true
under the commerce clause.
The Equal Protection Clause
State activity as a market participant is subject to limitations imposed
by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment for the same
reason that the privileges and immunities clause poses limitations. When
denial of equal protection is alleged, the burden of proof on this issue is
weighed heavily in favor of the state: a classification will not be declared
invalid unless violation of a fundamental right is demonstrated, along with
a showing that the classification is not rationally related to a legitimate
purpose and that it does not substantially further the asserted state objective.77
For many years, state action pertaining to social or economic welfare
was accorded great deference by the Supreme Court.78 There was rarely
a question as to the legitimacy of the asserted state purpose or motive;
the focus was on whether a rational relationship existed between the purpose and the statutory classification chosen to effectuate it.
There is, however, one recent case that has left many people guessing
on the legitimacy of purpose issue. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
v. Ward,79 the Court struck down an Alabama domestic preference tax
that imposed a higher tax rate on out-of-state insurance companies. A
federal law authorized the express discrimination against interstate commerce."' The question before the Court was whether the two legislative
purposes offered for the tax, promoting the instate insurance industry
and encouraging investment of insurance revenues in the state, were valid.
The Court reviewed both purposes closely and found that their discriminatory effect violated the equal protection clause.
The opposite result was reached in a later decision, Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors."'In that case, the broad application of equal
protection principles in MetropolitanLife is that if a state adopts a market
participant stance for the express purpose of discriminating against interstate interests, it might violate the equal protection clause. 82
77. See generally Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).

78. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973). See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970).
79. 105 S.Ct. 1676 (1985).
80. The McCarron-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1982), exempts the insurance
industry from commerce clause restrictions on state regulation.
81. 105 S.Ct. 2545 (1985). In both NortheastBancorp and MetropolitanLife, the states

argued that federal legislation authorized the facially discriminatory treatment of interstate
commerce. The NortheastBancorp decision is more in line with traditional equal protection
analysis.
82. Another view of MetropolitanLife would be that a statute that discriminates against
interstate commerce creates a new "suspect" classification requiring that a "compelling"
state interest be endangered for the law to be valid. Admittedly, this is an unusual equal
protection case. Alabama's statute could not be challenged under the commerce clause because
Congress had specifically authorized this type of statutory regulation. There was no viola-
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LIMITATIONS DERIVED FROM FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS

Federal activity may create exclusive state rights to water resources

by unilateral action or by approval of compacts, or it may limit the amount
of water available for the state to appropriate. This section examines those
constitutional provisions that give substance to the principle of federalism
by allocating authority between the federal government
and the individual
83
states. We begin with the tenth amendment.
There has been a tension between the tenth amendment and other provisions of the Constitution that give the federal government plenary
authority, particularly the commerce clause. In the past year, the Court
made it clear that Congress, and not the Court, must determine what
powers are reserved exclusively for the states. 4 Interstate Compacts and
their interpretation reflect this tension. The issue is whether a compact
is just another piece of federal legislation or an explicit recognition of state
authority protected by the amendment.

Interstate compacts form the backbone of the plans in many states
for appropriation and control of surface waters precisely because compacts

are agreements that define available supply. The compacts are integral
to a state water plan because, ultimately, surface water is the only reliable
and renewable supply. The process by which states formulate compacts
approved by Congress is one of the best examples of how the federal
system can accommodate the diverse states' sovereign or quasi-sovereign
interests.8 5 In general, Congress participates by encouraging states to
negotiate compacts. Once a compact is agreed to by the party states it
must be approved by Congress under the compacts clause of the Constitution. It has then been approved by a majority of representatives from all
the states and becomes federal law.
tion of the privileges and immunities clause because the clause protects "citizens" or individuals, not businesses. Thus, the equal protection clause was the only basis available for
asserting that the statute was unconstitutional. Perhaps this is the most crucial aspect of
the decision: the Court's willingness to use equal protection to reach out and strike down
what it perceives to be irrational and discriminatory legislation that works its way through
the cracks of constitutional theory.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by the State, are reserved to the states respectively, or
to the people."
84. See generally Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S.Ct. 1005
(1985). The structural argument is given force by the constitutional provisions concerning
state equality or equal representation in the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, art. V. If the
Senate adopts a measure, then the states have consented to it. Absent some clear failure
of the constitutional scheme, the Amendment does not preclude federal action that the states
find later to be merely onerous. Two standard types of legislative action bolstered the argument of the Garciamajority: (1) federal statutes that have special provisions when the law
acts upon the state, or express exemptions applicable to the states, and (2) statutes that
direct federal revenues to the states for services.
85. The legislative history of the early La Plata Compact reflects this view of compacts:
Mr. King: Is the Federal Government interested in that in any way or is there
any obligation incurred under it?
Mr. Bursum: There is no obligation, Mr. President; but a compact was authorized by the Congress to be entered into between Colorado and New Mexico
as to the waters of the La Plata. That compact has been agreed upon between
the two States, and under the resolution it was required that the Congress
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The courts have not addressed the distinction between the compacting process and other federal legislation. It is arguable, though, that a
compact is a different species of rulemaking and is used because different
principles are implicated. By definition, a compact is an agreement between states somewhat analogous to a treaty. Although there is a federal
interest because more than one state is affected and Congress could
unilaterally impose a solution fashioned by the legislative majority, there
is also a compelling interest to allow those parties most affected by the
outcome-the residents of the compacting states-to determine the rules
they will live by. Federal approval of the agreement, then, is the acquiescence of the majority to a regional solution to a regional problem
in the interest of self-governance.8 6 Under the Court's interpretation of
the tenth amendment it would seem that compacts create state-held proprietary interests not subject to any limitation derived from the dormant
commerce clause.
The decision in Sporhase,however, has thrown into question the certainty of future water supplies in individual states. The court has placed
into the matrix a countervailing need-the need in our federal system for
water to flow to its highest economic use in the interstate water system.
The possible impacts of Sporhase and other cases on congressionally approved compacts between states merit discussion.
Even if no substantive interpretation is given to the compact clause,
it is a straightforward argument that congressionally approved compacts
provide each state with a fixed amount of water outside the interstate
market. First, a compact between states which regulates an interstate
stream becomes a federal law enacted pursuant to the commerce clause
when approved by Congress."7 Under the commerce clause, Congress can
authorize states to impede interstate commerce. Therefore, when Congress
approves a compact, it expressly authorizes states to retain compacted
water in perpetuity and Sporhase is not applicable. 88
While the argument that congressional approval of compacts creates
exclusive state apportionments of water seems clear on its face, there is
sufficient uncertainty to suggest that there are circumstances in which
the protection might not be absolute. Indeed, one commentator has
concluded:
should consent to the compact. There is no other obligation whatever. It is
a matter which involves no interest to anyone except Colorado and New Mexico, which are using the water of the La Plata River, which flows through the

two States.
REC. H2246 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1925). Muys, in his report to the National Water Commission on Interstate Water Compact, states that "the Court has viewed the purpose of
CONG.

the compact clause as essentially protective in nature, affording Congress a veto over those
interstate agreements which might be prejudicial to broader national interests." J. Muys,
INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS 248 (1971) (citing Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause
of the Constitution-A Study in InterstateAdjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 691-95 (1925)).

86. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1982).
87. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone Compact Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 293 (D. Mont.
1983), aff'd, 769 F.2d 568 (9th cir. 1985).
88. Id
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[Mly guess is that the Court, in the absence of explicit territorial
limitations [in a compact) will tend to be unfavorably disposed to
state restrictions which interfere with providing water to expanding population centers and it will not construe compacts as placing territorial limitations on water use that avoid commerce clause
scrutiny. The Court will be more inclined to solve the population
problems than to read the intent of state legislatures into federal
law."9
The key issue is how specific a compact must be in providing a state with
the exclusive use of a quantity of water for the Court to conclude that
the commerce clause has been waived by Congress.
In many cases, the specificity of a compact may not be an issue. For
example, the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact provides that each
state has the exclusive beneficial consumptive use of a portion of water
in perpetuity. 90The Klamath River Compact prohibits the transportation
of water outside the upper Klamath River Basin.9 1The Snake River Compact, 2 the Yellowstone River Compact 93 and the Kansas-Nebraska Big
Blue River Compact 94 condition out-of-basin use of the water on the approval of the signatory states or the compact commissions. The express
language of the Yellowstone River Compact has been upheld by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in the face of a constitutional challenge on commerce clause grounds. 95 Such decisions, however, do not indicate what
would happen in the case of a compact that is vague or makes no reference
to the potential place of use of the water.
Recently, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of the degree
of specificity necessary in a congressional act to vitiate the commerce
clause. In South-Central Timber v. Winnicke, the Court stated: "[Flor a
state regulation to be removed from the reach of the dormant Commerce
Clause, congressional intent must be unmistakably clear." 96 It stated further that congressional action in this area is not a "wooden formalism,"
but rather it must be clear that Congress has made a "collective decision"
to benefit one state. Requiring states to prove that Congress affirmatively
contemplated a waiver of the commerce power "reduces significantly the
interests will be adversely affected by restraints
risk that unrepresented
97
on commerce."
89. R. Simms (Untitled paper presented at Rocky Mountain Legal Foundation Seminar,
June 1985) (available from the author).
90. Pub. L. No. 37, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31, 32 (1949).
91. Pub. L. No. 85-222, 71 Stat. 497, 499 (1957).
92. Pub. L. No. 464, ch. 73, 64 Stat. 29, 31 (1950).
93. Pub. L. No. 231, ch. 629, 65 Stat. 663, 669 (1951).
94. Pub. L. No. 92-308, 86 Stat. 193, 197 (1972).
95. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone Compact Comm'n, 726 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1985).
96. South-Central Timber v. Wunnicke, 104 S.Ct. 2237, 2242 (1984).
97. Id at 2243. This specificity requirement has been consistently followed by the
Supreme Court. For example, the twenty-first amendment to the Constitution prohibits "the
transportation or importation into any State, Territory or possession of the United States
for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof." On its
face, the amendment appears to give expressly to the states the exclusive power to control
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In short, the issue of how express a compact must be to give the states
exclusive use of compacted waters creates great uncertainty for states
relying exclusively on their compacts as the basis for a state water plan.
Assuming that a compact does make a state the owner of its compacted
share, if the state allows the creation of privately held, transferable property rights in the water, does the compact give the state authority to
regulate the transfer of rights in a discriminatory manner? Since many
compacts cover water that is already appropriated by private persons,
if those persons could transfer the water out of state, the compact would
appear to be meaningless if it did not bind the states's citizens as well.
Certainly, the Hinderliderv. La PlataRiver & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 98
case supports this argument. There, the Supreme Court held that the
states have the power to agree to a compact allocation irrespective of the
private rights of citizens and that the state, as sovereign or quasisovereign, can bind its citizens.9 Professor Trelease, however, appears to
support the view that apportioned waters, like state-owned timbers, once
placed in purely private ownership, must be allowed to move freely in interstate commerce. 10 0
the importation of liquor into the state irrespective of considerations of interstate commerce.
Yet the Supreme Court held that it granted no such power. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,
104 S.Ct. 3049 (1984). In United States v. Taylor, the First Circuit Court of Appeals refused
to find a federal waiver of the commerce clause when interpreting a federal statute similar
to the twenty-first amendment but relating to state fish and game laws. The court stated
that to waive the commerce clause it must find an "unmistakably clear design to validate
state laws." United States v. Taylor, 752 F.2d 757 (1st Cir. 1985), cert.granted 54 U.S.L.W.
3293 (U.S. 1985).
98. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
99. Id at 105-06. Sporhase and South-CentralTimber, however, may undercut this view.
First, in Sporhase, the Court found that state ownership of water is a legal fiction and,
therefore, if the state has relinquished its compacted right to control the use of water to
private citizens then the commerce power may dictate that the water be allowed to move
in interstate commerce. In Alaska, no one could seriously doubt that timber on state lands
belongs to the state. Unlike the purely private water rights in Sporhase, where the state
was not the owner of the resource, in Alaska the state can initially distribute its timber
resources to whomever it chooses. On the other hand, once severed from the state lands and
put in private hands, the commerce clause controlled distribution of the timber, not Alaska's
previous ownership.
100. Trelease, State Waters and State Lines: Commerce in WaterResources, 56 U. COLO.
L. REV. 347, 350-51 (1985). Professor Trelease draws a distinction between unappropriated
compacted water, such as exists on the Powder River in Wyoming and which the state may
keep for the future, and water appropriated into private ownership, which must be allowed
to move in interstate commerce:
In 1945, when Nebraska sued Wyoming for allowing its citizens to violate
Nebraskans' priorities, the Supreme Court refused to appoint a federal water
master to enforce priorities across the state line. Instead, the Court decreed
a percentage division of the water: twenty-five percent to Wyoming and seventyfive percent to Nebraska. When this was subdivided according to intrastate
priorities, interstate priorities were sufficiently protected. The North Platte
percentages, however, do not have the same effect as the Powder River division. Suppose that a Nebraska power plant purchases the water right of a
Wyoming rancher and closes the Wyoming headgate, so that seventy-six percent of the river flows down to Nebraska and only twenty-four percent is used
within Wyoming. Wyoming could not enact an embargo statute to prevent
the sale and keep the benefits within it: this is exactly what Sporhaseoutlaws.
A Wyoming water right is a transferable right; if it is transferable within Wyoming it can be transferred outside of the state.
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Yet another area of uncertainty is the extent to which a compact might
preclude temporary transfers of privately held water rights, even if the
compact grants an exclusive right to a state. A lease of water out of state
does not necessarily sever the state's ultimate right to have the water
rights remain in the state. Rather, it merely changes the place of beneficial
use in the short run.
With respect to tributary groundwater, the issues are the same as with
surface water, with two important distinctions. The first is that it is rare
for compacts to expressly include groundwater in their apportionment.
A possible reason is that most interstate compacts were created prior to
the Sporhase decision and it was generally assumed that states owned
groundwater located within the territory of the state. This is obvious from
the legislative history of many compacts. The second distinction is that
even though a compact may not expressly include groundwater, states
must regulate tributary groundwater use to insure deliveries of surface
water required by compacts. Therefore, tributary groundwater is included in the compact, regardless of what it says on its face. The primary
source of uncertainty here is not the law, but science, since hydrology
determines whether there is a relationship between a stream and a given
aquifer.
LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE PROPERTY CLAUSE

Before the turn of the century, the federal government did not assert
any proprietary interest in water resources. The general rule was that
states held the waters within their boundaries in trust for the people of
a state. 0 1' In the humid, riparian east there was no scarcity so there was
no need to protect federal uses from uses allowed by state law.
With the growth of the western prior appropriation systems, it became
evident that a means of asserting federal proprietary interests in water
was needed. In Winters. v. United States,02 the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of federal proprietary rights and held that when the federal government reserves or withdraws lands from the public domain, it also reserves or appropriates enough unappropriated water to fulfill the purposes
of the reservation or withdrawal of land. In most instances the priority
date is when the reservation or withdrawal is made by the federal government. 03 A relatively recent case has narrowed the standard by establishing
that where lands are withdrawn for a variety of purposes, the federal
reserve right is for0 the
quantity necessary to meet the primary purpose
4
of the reservation.'

Federal proprietary rights do not affect the ability of the state to appropriate water. State appropriation might raise some novel issues,
though, if it were used to deny an appropriation by the federal govern101.
102.
103.
104.

Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
207 U.S. 564 (1908).
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 456 (1963).
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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ment. In UnitedStates v. California,°5the Supreme Court held that federal
actors are subject to state regulation to some extent; they must obtain
permits pursuant to state law. If the state appropriated all the presently
unappropriated water, there would be none to meet reserved rights,
especially those which may expand over time. The federal government,
then, would have to condemn state-held rights or enter the water market,
either leasing or purchasing water from the state or private parties. This
argues for considering potential federal rights in any planning process.
At least one state has developed a comprehensive planning process
that includes federal reserved rights. Montana's program has two components: the state reservation system allows state and federal entities to
reserve water now for uses in the future, and the Reserved Water Rights
Commission negotiates with Indian tribes and the federal government to
determine the extent of federal reserved rights. 10 6 The planning process
has been criticized as too time consuming and costly, and it has raised
some heated controversy. This has led the state to question the suitability of the planning process.0 7 It is not clear, however, that the alternativeextensive litigation-is any more efficient or equitable. Since 1966 New
Mexico has been litigating an adjudication of the Nambe-Pojoaque stream
system. 0 8 In addition to rights of numerous individual users, federal
reserved rights for a national forest and the rights of four Indian pueblos
(reservations) must be determined. Estimates of the total costs of all of
the parties range from at least $5 million to $7.5 million.0 9 Furthermore,
animosity between the parties has reached a fever pitch-and all for a maximum of 30,000 acre-feet of water per year."0
Perhaps the greatest property clause issue is the potential extent of
congressional power. As pointed out in other studies,"' a simple amendment to the Desert Lands Act"' could effectively federalize all unappropriated groundwater underlying federal land, thereby precluding any
state appropriation system as far as these waters are concerned. As the
costs of litigation escalate, new legislation might seem preferable to congressional leaders, especially if no attempts are made to improve the adjudication process.
105. 438 U.S. 645 (1978).

106. In the five years that the commission has been in existence, only one agreement

has been adopted: The Fort Peck Compact, an agreement between the Assiniboine and Sioux
Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation and the State of Montana. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-201
(1985).

107. Report of the Select Committee on Water Marketing, 49th Mont. Legis. (January
1985).
108. State of New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, No. 66390-M (D.N.M. Filed 1966).
109. Telephone discussion with Assistant U.S. Attorney Herbert Becker in Albuquerque, New Mexico (Feb. 1985).
110. I&
111. WATER LAW STUDY COMMITTEE, THE IMPACT OF RECENT DECISIONS CONCERNING
WATER AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE ON WATER RESOURCES OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

A

REPORT TO GOVERNOR TONEY ANAYA AND THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL PURSUANT TO LAWS,

ch. 98 (1983) (published by the Institute of Public Law).
112. 43 U.S.C.A. § 321-39 (West 1986).
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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

Congress' plenary power to regulate commerce under the commerce
clause is the greatest limitation on state activity in the interstate market.
Even where Congress has not acted, the clause prohibits state regulation
which discriminates against or unduly burdens the free flow of commerce
among the states. 1 '3 Unlawful discrimination arises in two ways: (1) if a
statute expressly prefers intrastate commerce over interstate commerce;
and (2) if the statute is neutral but the motive behind the statute is to
discriminate against the interstate market or the statute has a discriminatory effect when applied in a particular instance. Due to the state's
heightened regulatory interest over water resources, however, a state may
prefer primarily non-economic uses in the state over interstate uses. "4
When Congress acts to regulate commerce it usually does so in conjunction with other federal duties such as its duty to protect the national
public welfare, to meet federal treaty obligations, to approve compacts
or to enforce individual rights recognized in the Constitution. In these
instances, Congress acts because the majority manifests a national
preference in favor of some value over those related to the unbridled
market's purely economic preferences. Congress can take action that impedes the market, or it can direct the states to take otherwise discriminatory actions." 5 If a state is acting pursuant to federal law, it can burden
commerce. The issue is whether Congress intended to allow a state to impede commerce in the manner being challenged. As pointed out in the
discussion of compacts, courts are reluctant to find congressional approval
of burdensome state action in vague or unspecific federal legislation.
State market participation activity is subject to congressional regulation under the commerce power. If Congress has not acted, however, the
commerce clause does not apply unless the state is said to be regulating
commerce." 6 Thus, the state can acquire water rights and sell them
without running afoul of this constitutional provision; however, a federal
law could preempt the state if Congress chose to enact one. In Wisconsin
Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations, et al. v. Gould,
Inc., I" the Supreme Court rejected an attempt by the state to evade the
preemptive effect of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) under the
guise of market participation. Although the NLRA would not have prohibited a private individual from conduct ascribed to the state, the preemptive effect of the NLRA did preclude inconsistent state action.
We cannot believe that Congress intended to allow States to interfere with.., the NLRA as long as they did so through exercises of the spending power... [G]overnment occupies a unique
113.
114.
115.
116.
(1976).
117.

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
See supra text accompanying notes 9-27.
See supra text accompanying notes 90-99.
Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794
54 U.S.L.W. 4428 (Feb. 26, 1986).
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position of power in our society, and its conduct, regardless of
form, is rightly subject to special restraints."'
Congress has, in the past, enacted legislation to counteract the ill effects of unrestrained market participation by private enterprise. The anti11 9
trust laws prohibit monopolistic trade practices. In Parker v. Brown,
the Supreme Court held that federal antitrust acts do not apply to state
regulatory programs. Thus, California could adopt a marketing program
that prevented raisin producers from freely marketing their crop without
violating federal antitrust laws. In a subsequent decision, the Court concluded that "the Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct
engaged in as an act of government by the State as sovereign .. pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service."120
It is unlikely that a state would ever be subject to antitrust actions
as a market participant even though technically it was made subject to
the antitrust laws. State market participation is not aimed at acquiring
a large market share to artificially drive up the price of water so as to
make inordinate profits for the state. Furthermore, given the number of
presently existing private rights, it is unlikely that a state could monopolize the water market. In any event, an attempt by a state to monopolize
water rights and make excessive profits by making the price artificially
high or to discriminate against commerce would violate principles of antitrust law or the dormant commerce clause or both.
CONCLUSION

While a state's regulatory powers over water resources are heightened
by virtue of the public trust doctrine, a state cannot rely on this authority alone to ensure water supplies for continued present and expanded
with
118. Id at 4430. The Wisconsin statute prohibited the state from doing business
101.245
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future uses. Regulatory action is subject to the constraints of the commerce clause and the interstate water market, and interstate controversies boil down to the value-ladden perceptions of whether the action protects primarily noneconomic uses or amounts to economic protectionism.
This ad hoc case-by-case approach is hardly a good method for shaping
any state's water future. It is costly, both emotionally and economically.
State participation in the water market is a positive alternative to this
process. It cannot, however, be a disguise for otherwise impermissible
regulation of private transactions. The state may not give up to the private
sector freely transferable water rights and later limit the transfer of those
rights at the state line. No matter what constitutional provision serves
as a basis for a challenge, preferential economic protectionism through
regulation of private transactions is not valid under current constitutional
doctrine.
The state market participant doctrine is not a method for "getting
around" the commerce clause. It recognizes the existence of the interstate
market and simply anticipates operation within it. By participating in the
interstate market, a state, like any private buyer or seller, may determine
the the terms of a transaction. It may decide when to sell or lease water
for uses in a manner that maximizes the benefits to the state. Through
this mechanism, the state can capture the equity interest in water
resources that it has carefully created through water regulation and investment of its taxpayers' capital. 2 ' Market participation is not a substitute for careful regulation and planning, but an additional means to
enhance the certainty of available supply for a wide variety of future uses.

121. See Trelease, State Water and State Lines: Commerce in Water Resources, 56 U.

COLO. L. REV. 347 (1985). Trelease argues persuasively that where water is distributed for
out-of-state uses a state should still be able to capture the secondary benefits it would have
received if water had been used in the state. The state should be able to bargain to prevent
collateral harms. "The in-state user pays his toll in property taxes and the production of
wealth, and the exporting appropriator pays an approximate equivalent in cash or works
for local development." Id at 372.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol21/iss2/5

24

